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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case. 
This case began as an action for the alleged breach of an oral lease agreement and waste 
brought by Plaintiff Douglas Visser (hereinafter "Doug"), against Defendants Vicki Visser, 
Calvin Visser, and Auto Alley, LLC (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Vicki"). Doug and 
Vicki were previously married, and upon their divorce, their real property was awarded to Doug. 
However, Vicki continued to occupy a portion of the real property, upon which she continued to 
operate an automobile salvage and crushing business (hereinafter "Junk Yard"). After years of 
operating the Junk Yard, Doug sued Vicki, seeking to have her removed from the property. 
On August 15, 2013, the parties attended mediation and entered into a Mediated 
Settlement Agreement ("MSA"), thereby extinguishing all prior claims. (P's Ex. 31 ). The 
District Court entered a Stipulated Judgment based upon the MSA. (P's Ex. 17). Pursuant to the 
terms of the Stipulated Judgment, Doug agreed to convey title to a portion of the real property, 
known as Lot 2, to Vicki, subject to a number of conditions. (Id.). Among the conditions, the 
parties were to have the property platted, so that it could be legally split and conveyed. Also, 
each party was to assume half of an existing mortgage, which was in favor of an individual by 
the name of Joe Lapham (hereinafter the "Lapham Mortgage."). (Id.). 
Vicki substantially performed under the Agreement. She paid more than $45,000 in back 
real estate taxes, paid down her share of the shared mortgage from approximately $180,000 to 
approximately $30,000, obtained and provided a Phase I Environmental report, moved the entire 
Junk Yard from Lot 1 to Lot 2, paid for the completion of a plat splitting the property into Lot 1 
and Lot 2, and graveled and leveled the properties at her own expense. Nevertheless, the District 
Court ruled that Vicki and the other Defendants forfeited all of their investment on account of 
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three breaches of the Stipulated Judgment: (I) the leaving of a small amount of personal property 
on Lot I; (2) the continued use of a small portion of a road located on Lot 1; and (3) the failure to 
pay the entire amount of Vicki's share of the Lapham Mortgage. The District Court refused to 
apply an equitable analysis to the issue of whether the remedy provided in the Stipulated 
Judgment constituted an inequitable penalty 
It is Vicki' s position that the District Court erred in failing to apply binding precedent, 
that the remedy provision in the Stipulated Judgment constitutes an unenforceable liquidated 
damage provision, resulting in a windfall to Doug. Vicki also contends that the District Court's 
finding that Doug did not interfere with Vicki' s ability to pay off the remainder of the Lapham 
Mortgage is not supported by the evidence admitted at trial, and is, in fact, contradicted by four 
different witnesses, including Doug himself. 
These errors require the reversal and remand of the District Court' s findings. 
B. The Course of the Proceedings. 
1. On June 25, 2013, Doug filed a Complaint for waste and breach of contract, 
together with an application for a pre-judgment writ of attachment and a temporary restraining 
order. (R. Vol. I, p. 28). 
2. The District Court entered the temporary restraining order on July 3, 2013. (R. 
Vol. I, p.64). 
3. On or about October 15, 2013 the parties attended mediation and entered into a 
mediated settlement agreement ("MSA"). (R. Vol. I, p. 109) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 6 
4. On or about January 16, 2014, Counsel for Doug prepared and faxed a copy of the 
proposed Stipulated Judgment to the District Court. (R. Vol. I, p. 87). 
5. On or about February 19, 2014, the District Court entered the proposed Stipulated 
Judgment. (R. Vol. I, p. 89) 
6. The Stipulated Judgment obligates Doug to convey to Vicki title to the 6.2 acres of 
the real property designated as Lot 2, upon the satisfaction of the conditions set forth therein. (R. 
Vol. I, p. 90, ,r A(l); Plaintiff's Ex. 12). Doug was to retain Lot 1. 
7. On April 3, 2014, Doug filed a motion for writ of possession and judgment of 
quiet title, seeking to eliminate any right of ownership of Vicki in Lot 2. An evidentiary hearing 
was held on April 23, 2014. (R. Vol. I, p. 103). 
8. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court found that Vicki had substantially 
complied with the Stipulated Judgment and denied Doug's motion. (R. Vol. I, p. 103). 
9. On May 7, 2014, Vicki filed a motion entitled Motion Re: Plaintiff's Interference 
with Defendants' Ability to Comply with the Judgment. (R. Vol. I, p. 144). 
10. A hearing was held on Vicki' s Motion for Interference on May 21 , 2014. 
Following the hearing, the District Court denied Vicki's motion. (R. Vol. I, p. 159). 
11 . On March 26, 2015, Vicki filed a motion for contempt. (R. Vol. I, p. 164). 
12. On March 27, 2015, Doug filed a second motion for writ of possession and quiet 
title. (R. Vol. I, p. 173). 
13. An evidentiary hearing was held to address both motions on May 20, 28, and 29, 
2015. 
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14. Following the three day evidentiary hearing, the District Court entered its findings 
and conclusions of law. (R. Vol. ill, p. 466). 
15. Vicki moved the District Court to reconsider its decision on July 20, 2015. (R. 
Vol. III, p. 495). 
16. Following the August 5th hearing on Vicki's motion to reconsider, the District 
Court issued its Second Memorandum Decision and Order denying relief to Vicki. (R. Vol. III, 
p. 564). 
17. Vicki timely appealed the District Court's decisions. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
I. On August 15, 2013, the parties to this action entered into a Mediated Settlement 
Agreement, resolving disputes regarding ownership of real property located in Ponderay, Idaho, 
and related issues (hereinafter the "MSA"). (Plaintiff's Exhibit 31 ). 
2. On February 19, 2014, the Court entered a Judgment (hereinafter "Stipulated 
Judgment") pursuant to the Mediated Settlement Agreement. (R. Vol. I, p. 89). 
3. Pursuant to the Judgment, Douglas Visser was to split the property into two 
parcels via the platting process, and to convey to Vicki Visser Lot 2 upon the Defendants' 
performance of certain obligations, which included vacating Lot 1, commissioning a Phase I 
Environmental Study, providing a copy of said study to the Plaintiff's Counsel, and paying off 
Vicki Visser' s half of the mortgage the parties owed to lender Joe Lapham. Id. 
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22. Consequently, Vicki filed a motion for contempt, asking the Court to find Doug in 
contempt for interfering with Vicki's ability to obtain Lot 2, and for liquidating the equity in the 
property via the refinance. (R. Vol. I, p. 164 ). 
23. The following day, Doug filed a second motion for a writ of possession and an 
action to quiet title to Lot 2. (R. Vol. I, p. 173). A three-day evidentiary hearing was held on the 
motions. 
24. Following the evidentiary hearing, the parties submitted written arguments to the 
District Court. Vicki argued that the relief being sought by Doug constitutes an inequitable 
forfeiture, given the time, money, and resources that Vicki had put towards performance of her 
obligations in the Stipulated Judgment. Specifically, she argued that the provisions of the 
Stipulated Judgment providing Doug with the right to apply for an immediate writ of possession 
for any failure to perform constituted an unenforceable liquidated damage provision and 
consequently, the relief sought by Doug could not be granted by the District Court. (R. Vol. II, 
p. 359). 
25. Vicki presented evidence in support of her arguments that she had already paid 
more than $130,000.00 in payments towards her half of the Lapham Mortgage, $45,418.77 in 
back real estate taxes owing on Lots 1 and 2, $2,000.00 in subdivision costs, $16,000.00 to 
gravel the property, $3,000.00 to level the property, $12,800 in rental equipment to repair 
Doug' s portion of the real property, and $2,400.00 to complete a Phase I environmental study. 
(Defendants'Ex. H). 
26. Vicki also argued that Doug had unreasonably prevented her from fully complying 
with the terms of the Judgment. Specifically, she presented evidence that: 
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a. Vicki had arranged and received approval from Joe Lapham, the holder of the 
Lapham Mortgage, to refinance the remaining $30,000.00 owing by Vicki on the 
Lapham Mortgage, using Lot 2 as collateral for the refinance. (Plaintiff's Ex. 4; 
Tr. Vol. III, p. 104-105; p. 178-179; p. 237, L. 11-17; p.307-308). 
b. Doug, nevertheless, refused to allow Lot 2 to be used as collateral for a refinance 
until Vicki completed additional tasks not set forth in the Judgment, including: 
1. The construction of a new road by November l, 2014 upon Lot 1, on the 
parcel to be retained by Doug; 
11. The repair of a parking lot located upon Doug's real property; 
m. The completion of additional environmental studies to include a "clean bill 
of environmental health" for Lot 1 ; and 
1v. That Vicki obtain her own water meter and service by November 1, 2014. 
(Plaintiff's Ex. 4; Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 128-129; p.179, L.7-23; p. 254, L.21-25, 
p.255, L.1-23; p. 308, L.17-25; p. 309, L. 1-20; p. 392, L. 2-22; p. 417-
418). 
27. Among the findings in its First Memorandum Decision and Order granting the 
Plaintiff's motion for a writ of possession, the District Court found that Vicki had failed to 
comply with the obligations of the Judgment and that Doug had secured a new loan using Lots 1 
and Lot 2 as collateral. Specifically, the Court found: 
1. Vicki did not fully vacate and restore Lot 1 by the April 30 deadline. 
Specifically, Vicki left some items of personal property on Lot 1; failed to 
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repair some damage to the buildings on Lot 1 caused by the move; and 
used portion of a road on Lot 1 to access Lot 2; 
11. That Vicki did not pay all of her half of the Lapham Mortgage on or 
before June 30, 2014; 
111. District Court did not make a specific finding as to the sums paid by Vicki 
towards the debt, or the other improvements Vicki made to Lots 1 and 2. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 466). 
28. After the hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration, the District Court issued its 
Second Memorandum Decision and Order. In that Order, the District Court failed to properly 
analyze the issues presented in Vicki's Motion for Reconsideration. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
a. Was the forfeiture provision contained within the Stipulated Judgment enforceable by 
the District Court, does the record support the District Court's order granting the 
forfeiture, or did the District Court abuse its discretion in granting the forfeiture? 
b. Did Doug prevent Vicki from complying with the terms of the Stipulated Judgment 
and, if so, is Vicki thereby excused from nonperformance? 
c. Is Vicki entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
a. The District Court Should not have Enforced the Forfeiture Provision Contained 
within the Stipulated Judgment. 
i. The District Court Erred in Finding that the Rules of Equity Did Not 
Apply to Vicki's Claims Because There was no Underlying Contract. 
The District Court found there was no underlying contract between the parties, thus the 
' equitable defenses' raised by Vicki at trial and upon reconsideration were inapplicable. This 
finding is clearly erroneous and should be set aside. 
"Formation of a contract is generally a question of fact for the trier of fact to 
resolve." Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701 , 702, 779 P.2d 15, 16 (1989). "A trial 
court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless the findings are clearly erroneous. If 
the findings of fact are based upon substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, they 
will not be overturned on appeal." Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 43, 205 P.3d 1175, 1179 
(2009). 
In its First Memorandum Decision, the District Court found that the damage provision in 
the Stipulated Judgment was enforceable because the terms of the Stipulated Judgment were 
unambiguous. (R. Vol. III, p. 473). Thereafter, Vicki filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 
arguing, in part, that the Court erred in finding the damage provision enforceable simply because 
the terms were unambiguous. (Id. at 498). Vicki reiterated her argument that the District Court 
must make a finding as to whether the damage provision in the Stipulated Judgment resulted in 
an arbitrary, exorbitant, and unconscionable penalty, and whether the provision was reasonably 
related to the anticipated damages. (Id. at 499). After a hearing on the Motion to Reconsider, 
the District Court issued its Second Memorandum Decision (Id. at 564). In this decision, the 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 15 
District Court again rejected the argument that the contract enforced an illegal penalty, finding 
instead that there was no underlying contract between the parties to support Vicki's proposed 
defense. (Id. at 570). 
This conclusion is clearly erroneous. Idaho case law is very clear that a contract is 
formed when a judgment is entered by stipulation. Jim & Maryann Plane Family Trust v. 
Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, 342 P.3d 639, 645 (2015) (" ... A stipulation is a contract, [and] its 
enforceability is determined through contract principles."). There is no question that the parties 
in this matter entered into a stipulation, which was a product of mediation, and a Judgment was 
entered based upon that stipulation. (R. Vol. I, p. 89; R. Vol. Ill, p. 567). A stipulation being a 
contract, the District Court's finding that there was no contract between the parties is clearly 
erroneous and should be set aside. 
ii. The Court Erred by Refusing to Apply the Analysis Required by Graves 
and its Progeny, as to Whether the Forfeiture Provision in the Stipulated 
Judgment is an Unenforceable Penalty. 
It her post-trial briefing and in her motion for reconsideration, Vicki argued that the relief 
sought by Doug constituted a penalty for breach of contract and is therefore unenforceable by a 
court in equity. (R. Vol. II, p. 380-384; R. Vol. III, p. 498-501). As noted above, the District 
Court rejected Vicki's argument, first on the grounds that the terms of the judgment were 
unambiguous, then because it found there was no contract between the parties. Whether the 
contract is ambiguous has no bearing on whether the principals of equity apply in this case. The 
rules of equity do not somehow vanish so long as the terms of the contract are unambiguous. 
There is neither any precedent supporting this position, nor any policy basis for its application. 
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The Court has the power of equity regardless of the clarity of the draftsmanship of the underlying 
Stipulated Judgment. Moreover, as noted above, there can be no doubt that a contract existed 
between the parties in the form of the Stipulated Judgment. Respectfully, it was error for the 
District Court to find the cases cited by Vicki inapplicable to the facts of this case. 
Vicki maintains on appeal that the rule from Graves3 and its progeny are applicable to 
this case. That rule was recently summarized by this Court thusly; 
Parties to an agreement may fix damages in the event of breach, 
but this power is not without limits. "Historically, courts of equity 
developed a rule, later adopted by courts of law, that contractual 
clauses prescribing penalties for a breach of the contract would not 
be enforced because of the potential for over-reaching and 
unconscionable bargains." Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v. 
Meyer, 133 Idaho llO, ll7, 982 P.2d 945,952 (Ct.App.1999). This 
rule exists today. "Modem courts continue to refuse to enforce 
contract clauses that appear designed to deter a breach or to punish 
the breaching party rather than compensate the injured party for 
damage occasioned by the breach." Id. Indeed, if a forfeiture is 
"simply a penalty invoked as a result of conduct of one of the 
parties, the forfeiture will not be allowed." Fleming v. Hathaway, 
107 Idaho 157, 161, 686 P.2d 837, 841 (Ct.App.1984); see also 
Anderson v. Gailey, 100 Idaho 796, 801, 606 P.2d 90, 95 (1980) 
("We have long held in Idaho that the purpose of awarding 
damages for breach of contract is to fully recompense the non-
breaching party for its losses sustained because of the breach, not 
to punish the breaching party."). 
In Idaho, "where the forfeiture or damage fixed by the contract is 
arbitrary and bears no reasonable relation to the anticipated 
damage, and is exorbitant and unconscionable, it is regarded as a 
'penalty,' and the contractual provision therefor is void and 
unenforceable." Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451, 456, 272 P.2d 
1020, 1023 (1954) (overruled in part on other grounds by Benz v. 
D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 268 P.3d 1167 (2012)). The party 
seeking to invalidate a forfeiture provision bears the burden of 
3 Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451 , 456, 272 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1954) (overruled in part on other 
grounds by Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 268 P.3d 1167 (2012) 
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proving that the damages provided for by the provision amount to 
a penalty, either because the sum to be forfeited does not bear a 
reasonable relation to actual damages or because the agreed 
amount is exorbitant or unreasonable. Howard v. Bar Bell Land & 
Cattle Co. , 81 Idaho 189,197, 340 P.2d 103, 107 (1959); Fleming, 
107 Idaho at 161,686 P.2d at 841 . 
Melaleuca, Inc. v. Foeller, 155 Idaho 920, 927, 318 P.3d 910,917 (2014). 
This rule is not limited solely to land sale contracts, as argued by Doug and erroneously 
held by the District Court. In fact, the case cited above, Melaleuca, is an employment dispute 
that deals with the enforceability of a liquidated damage provision contained within a non-
compete agreement. None of the cases cited by Vicki are limited to contracts for the sale of land, 
and Doug provides no precedent so limiting these principles of equity. 
Since the defense argued by Vicki is applicable to the contract between these parties, it 
was the duty of the District Court to determine whether the facts supported that defense. In 
applying Graves, the District Court should have made a finding as to whether there was a 
forfeiture or damage fixed by the contract. Then the District Court should have made findings as 
to whether the sum forfeited bears a reasonable relation to actual damages or whether the agreed 
amount is exorbitant or unreasonable. 
Although the District Court did not make an explicit finding as to whether there was a 
forfeiture or damage fixed by the contract, it did acknowledge that its decision worked a 
forfeiture upon Vicki, just not an inequitable penalty.4 The holding is puzzling because only a 
few sentences prior to reaching that conclusion, the District Court found that the Graves analysis 
was inapplicable and would not be entertained. (R. Vol. ill, p. 570). As a result, the District 
4 
" • •• when the equities are balanced, the forfeiture granted in favor of Doug is not 
unconscionable and does not constitute and [sic] inequitable penalty." (R. Vol. III, p. 570). 
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Court did not engage in any sort of analysis of the penalty and whether it was unconscionable, 
and made no findings as to how the considerable investment made by Vicki into the properties 
was reasonably related to the damages suffered by Doug. Id. 
In fact, as proven at trial, Vicki invested substantially both in terms of money and labor in 
an effort to satisfy her obligations under the Stipulated Judgment, and to effectively purchase Lot 
2, including: the payment of more than $130,000 toward the Lapham Mortgage; the payment of 
more than $45,000 toward back real estate taxes for Lot 1 and Lot 2; providing a Phase I 
environmental impact study at a cost of $2,400; providing $2,000 to complete the platting of the 
property into Lot 1 and Lot 2; moving the entire Junk Yard onto Lot 2; spending $31,800 for 
gravel, equipment rental, and leveling the property, including the parking lot located on Lot 1; 
and arranging to refinance the remaining $30,000 owing on her half of the Lapham Mortgage. 
(Defendants'Ex. H). All of these monies and efforts have been forfeited by the Court's decision. 
Yet, the Court made no findings as to how Doug' s actual damages are reasonably related to the 
investment being forfeited by Vicki. It made finding as to what those sums might be, and failed 
to determine whether those sums were exorbitant or arbitrary. Its holding that the forfeiture was 
neither unconscionable nor a penalty is therefore not supported by the record and constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. Consequently, the District Court's Order granting Douglas Visser a writ of 
possession should be reversed. 
iii. There was a Forfeiture Clause in the Stipulated Judgment. 
It has been demonstrated that there was a contract between the parties and that Graves 
applies to all contracts containing a fixed forfeiture or damage provision. Now, the salient 
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question is whether the Stipulated Judgment, in fact, contained forfeiture or damage fixed by the 
contract, and, if so, whether that provision was enforceable by the District Court. 
The specific term of the Judgment granting Doug the right to a forfeiture is found on page 
6 of the Stipulated Judgment, paragraph "F," which states: 
Should Defendants fail to perform any obligation set forth above, 
Doug shall be entitled to a Writ of Possession and a Judgment of 
Quiet Title in and to all of the real property described in Exhibit 
"A" hereto. Further, Plaintiff shall thereon be relieved of any 
obligation to subdivide said property or to convey any portion 
thereof to Vicki. The Court shall thereafter enter a Judgment of 
Quiet Title in favor of Plaintiff, Douglas Visser, quieting any and 
all claims of Vicki to the real property described in Exhibit "A" 
upon such default or failure to perform my [sic] Defendants. Said 
Judgment of Quiet Title and Writ of Possession shall include 
direction to the Bonner County Sheriff or other authority to restore 
possession of the premises by thereafter removing and disposing of 
any and all personal property or inventory of Vicki upon the 
premises with the proceeds thereof to be paid to the Lapham debt 
as required by Lapham in a separate Modification of the Escrow 
account. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 94-95, ,r F). 
A forfeiture is defined as the divestiture of property without compensation or the loss of a 
right, privilege, or property because of a crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty. 
FORFEITURE, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). In the event of a forfeiture, title is 
simultaneously transferred to another, such as the government, a corporation, or a private person. 
Id. 
Paragraph "F" of the Stipulated Judgment clearly grants Doug the right to divest Vicki's 
interest in Lot 2. Its function is to deprive Vicki of her right to rely upon the Stipulated 
Judgment and causes her to lose all of the money and labor that she and the other Defendants 
invested into the property without compensation. Furthermore, simultaneous with the divestiture 
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of Vicki's right to use or to obtain compensation for her investment, the provision purports to 
require a Court to quiet title in favor of Doug against any and all claims of Vicki to Lot 2. 
Consequently, this provision squarely meets the definition of a forfeiture. 
It should be noted that this particular provision goes beyond merely forfeiting Vicki's 
right and interest in the subject matter of the contract (i.e., title to Lot 2), but also purports to 
divest Vicki and Calvin Visser of all of their personal property located on the property as well. 
iv. The Forfeiture Provision in the Stipulated Judgment Between the Parties 
in this Case is Unenforceable. 
Actions to forfeit contractual rights of the defaulting party, pursuant to a forfeiture clause, 
are addressed to the court's equitable discretion. Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451 , 272 P.2d 1020 
(1954). "The Supreme Court reviews the district court's rulings on equitable remedies for an 
abuse of discretion." O'Connor v. Harger, 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008). The 
standard of review for an abuse of discretion "is whether the court perceived the issue as one of 
discretion, acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason." Readv. Harvey, 147 Idaho 364,369,209 P.3d 661 , 666 (2009). 
Vicki asserts that the District Court abused its discretion in permitting forfeiture to occur 
because the District Court did not act within the boundaries of its discretion or consistently with 
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it. The District Court also 
failed to reach its decision by an exercise of reason. 
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1. Doug Waived his Right to Enforce the Forfeiture Provision. 
Vicki argued that Doug waived his right to declare a forfeiture by repeatedly accepting 
Vicki's late payments and failing to require strict adherence to the time frames included in the 
Stipulated Judgment. (R. Vol. II, p. 377-380). The District Court did not address this argument 
in either of its memorandum decisions. 
The Judgment required Vicki to pay half of the Lapham Mortgage, and all but 
approximately $30,000 of the original $180,000 balance owing by Vicki was paid. (R. Vol. I, p. 
91-92, ,r A(S)). Nearly all of those payments were late. Defendants' Ex. C). In fact, the 
payment ledger provided by Panhandle Escrow which was admitted at trial shows that at least 
five late payments were made by Vicki and accepted by Doug. Id. Defendants' Exhibit C 
indicates that late payments were made on February 13, 2014 for $6,800.00, February 28, 2014 
for $53,500.00, May 5, 2014 for $2,500.00, and July 16, 2014 for $80,000.00. Id. These 
substantial payments greatly enhanced the equity in both Lot I and Lot 2, and Doug effectively 
took that equity when he unilaterally refinanced both lots, and refused to convey Lot 2 to Vicki. 
In his first Motion for a Writ of Possession, filed on or about April 3, 2014, Doug did not 
allege a failure to timely make payments under the Stipulated Judgment. (R. Vol. I, p. 102). 
Instead, he argued that he was entitled to a writ of possession because Vicki was making 
payments by way of personal checks to Doug' s attorney rather than having the contractor or 
salvage purchaser pay Doug' s attorney directly. (R. Vol. I, p. 106). Despite their failure to 
strictly comply with the terms of the judgment, Doug accepted all of these late, direct payments, 
thereby benefitting by the increasing equity in his property. This includes the $80,000 paid by 
Vicki on or about July 16, 2014, which was after the June 30, 2014 deadline set forth in the 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 22 
Stipulated Judgment. (See Defendants'Ex. C; R. Vol. I, p. 92 ,r A(5)). By accepting these late 
payments, Doug waived his claim for strict compliance to the deadlines set forth in the 
Judgment. 
Where a contract for sale of real estate makes time of the essence, 
and provides for a forfeiture of the vendee's rights for failure on 
his part to make payments at certain times, a continued course of 
conduct on the part of the vendor in failing to declare a forfeiture, 
thereby leading the vendee to believe that the vendor waives a 
strict compliance with the terms of the contract, works a waiver of 
the vendor's right to declare a forfeiture, unless and until he 
gives the vendee reasonable notice of his intention to do so, and 
a reasonable opportunity to make the delinquent payments. 
Sullivan v. Burcaw, 35 Idaho 755,763,208 P. 841, 843 (1922) (emphasis added). 
The Judgment at issue here does not contain a clause indicating that time is of the 
essence. By repeatedly failing to declare a forfeiture, Doug established a course of conduct in 
which he led Vicki to believe he had waived strict compliance with the deadlines set forth in the 
Stipulated Judgment. 
Under such circumstances, this Court should hold that the conduct of Doug waived strict 
compliance with the deadlines set forth in the Judgment. In King v. Seebeck, 20 Idaho 223, 118 
P. 292 (1911), this Court long ago insisted that, 
[T]he party claiming the benefit of a forfeiture must show himself 
to be strictly within the terms of the instrument which confers that 
right. He must act promptly in asserting his claim and his acts 
relating thereto must be positive, unequivocal, and inconsistent 
with the continuance of the contract. . . . When the defendant 
informed Doug that he was unable to pay, and wanted more time, 
stating that he thought he could possibly raise the money ... Doug, 
if then determined to insist upon the forfeiture, ought to have said 
so in positive and unequivocal terms. He ought to have informed 
the defendant that he need not make any effort to raise the money 
as the time had passed, and the money would not be received on 
Saturday if tendered. On the contrary, he carefully refrained from 
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giving express consent to .further time, but in his own mind did 
consent . . . . He permitted the . defendant to engage in another 
effort to raise the money in the belief that if secured Doug would 
accept it. This attempt to hold on to the forfeiture and waive it does 
not show such candor and fairness as the circumstances demanded. 
He ought to be held to this waiver. 
King v. Seebeck, 20 Idaho at 233-234, 118 P. at 295, quoting.from Cue v. Johnson, 73 Kan. 558, 
85 P. 598 (1906). 
Doug did not provide Vicki with notice of his intention to declare a forfeiture nor allow 
her a reasonable opportunity to allow Vicki to pay the remaining $30,000. (R. Vol. III, p. 239, L. 
4-14; p. 313, L. 4-6). Rather, Doug unilaterally refinanced the debt, encumbering both Lots 1 
and 2. Nor did he attempt to pay his share of the debt by taking a loan out only on Lot 1. (R. 
Vol. III, p. 88, L. 19-25). Therefore, the forfeiture provision is unenforceable and this Court 
should reverse the District Court's Order. 
2. The record is insufficient to Support the District Court's Conclusion 
that the Forfeiture does not Constitute an Inequitable Penalty. 
The District Court held that "when the equities are balanced, the forfeiture granted in 
favor of Doug is not unconscionable and does not constitute and [sic] inequitable penalty." (R. 
Vol. III, p. 570). However, this holding is not supported by the facts that were admitted. "[l]t is 
for the trial court to determine under the facts of any particular case whether the amount 
Stipulated as damages bears such a reasonable relation to the damages actually sustained as to be 
' enforceable as a provision for liquidated damages." Clampitt v. A.MR. Corp., 109 Idaho 145, 
148, 706 P.2d 34, 37 (1985). 
In this case, the District Court made no specific findings as to the reasonableness of the 
relation between the amount forfeited by Vicki and the damages actually sustained by Doug. In 
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fact, it made no specific finding as to the total amount forfeited by Vicki, even in a general sense, 
or the amount of damage occasioned to Doug as a result of Vicki's breach of the Stipulated 
Judgment, despite evidence of such damages having been presented at trial. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 310, 
L. 13-15; p. 321-324; Defendants' Ex. H). Thus, it cannot be said that the District Court actually 
balanced the equities or engaged in appropriate fact finding to determine whether the amount 
Stipulated as damages bears a reasonable relation to the damages actually sustained by Doug. 
As noted above, the District Court did not engage in an analysis or make any finding as to 
whether the provision was arbitrary. The District Court held that the forfeiture was not 
unconscionable, but failed to support that conclusion with any factual determinations or legal 
analysis. (R. Vol. III, p. 570). 
Accordingly, the District Court's refusal to grant relief from forfeiture to Vicki should be 
reversed on the grounds that the record does not support such a decision. 
3. The District Court did not Act According to the Appropriate Legal 
Standard. 
The District Court correctly perceived the issue of whether the provision constituted a 
penalty as one of discretion (R. Vol. III, p. 570). However, the District Court did not act 
consistently with the legal standard, or come to its decision by an exercise of reason. The legal 
standard available to the District Court with respect to this issue was set forth in Graves, as 
explained and discussed in Section B above. 
As noted in Section B, the District Court was required to determine whether the forfeiture 
provision contained within the Stipulated Judgment amounted to a penalty. In order to reach a 
conclusion, one way or the other, the District Court should have followed the standard 
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established in Graves and its progeny. The District Court should have considered whether the 
damages fixed by the contract were arbitrary, whether they were reasonably related to Doug's 
actual damages, and whether they were unreasonable. 
Vicki put forward evidence and argument showing that the relief sought by Doug would 
cause Vicki to forfeit approximately $236,000.00 in payments made towards performance of the 
Stipulated Judgment. (Defendants' Ex. H). 
The District Court's failure to take these facts into account and apply the correct legal 
standard constitutes an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the Order forfeiting Vicki's right and 
interest in Lot 2 should be reversed, and the District Court should be instructed to issue a new 
order consistent with Graves and the facts presented at the evidentiary hearing, or to conduct an 
additional evidentiary hearing if the District Court cannot resolve the issue from the facts 
presently contained in the record. 
4. The Damages Considered by the Court were Irrelevant. 
In its second Memorandum Decision, the District Court found that Vicki had breached an 
oral lease agreement causing the principal of the Lapham debt to rise and that Doug had made a 
$14,591.74 payment on his 2009 tax bill. (R. Vol. III, p. 569). It is unclear if the District Court 
considered these to be actual damages suffered by Doug or simply background facts, but it bears 
mentioning that the Stipulated Judgment constitutes "a full, final and complete release of any and 
all claims and causes of action against one another or any other party named herein or any claims 
which could have been asserted herein." (R. Vol. I, p. 95, ,r G). Thus, the District Court should 
not have considered any of these facts. 
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In addition to these claims having been released, it appears that several of the facts the 
District Court took into account were allegations made by Doug that were premised upon Vicki's 
breach of an oral lease agreement. Not only were those claims settled by the MSA, they were 
unenforceable under the statute of frauds, I.C. § 9-505(4). 
Lastly, the evidence admitted at the evidentiary hearing regarding the oral lease 
agreement and certain tax payments appear to have been elicited and admitted for the purpose of 
giving the District Court background information, not as substantive evidence of the issues at 
trial. 
For example, counsel for Doug attempted to elicit an admission from Vicki Visser that 
she had rented the property upon which she operated the Junkyard from Doug. Counsel for 
Vicki objected: 
MR. McLAUGHLIN: Your Honor, [I] object. Anything before the 
settlement- before the Judgment isn't relevant. 
(Tr. Vol. III, p. 331 , L. 5-12). 
The Court overruled Mr. McLaughlin's objection on the basis that "the Court has to have 
a little bit of background," but acknowledged that "it's not all relevant, it does help the Court to -
just to understand how we got where we are." (Tr. Vol. III, p. 332, L. 10-25). 
Furthermore, when Doug testified about matters occurring prior to the execution of the 
MSA, his attorney informed the court that he was only asking questions for the purpose of 
providing background information: 
I want to cover a little bit of background, just as quickly as 
possible, as to how it came about that this lawsuit occurred," 
(Tr. Vol. III, p. 357, L. 1-6; p. 367, L. 8-25; p. 369-370). 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 27 
Finally, when Plaintiff's counsel objected to Vicki's testimony regarding the decree of 
divorce, the following exchange took place: 
MR. FEATHERSTON: Excuse me. I'm gonna object to any agreement that goes 
back ten, literally ten years now to must be early 2005, late 2004, and the divorce 
is merged into the Judgment of divorce-a decree of divorce which is an exhibit, I 
think. 
MR. McLAUGHLIN: Your Honor, I fully agree. I'm not offering it to indicate 
or try to enforce any agreement. All I'm offering for is to give you some sense as 
to my client's understanding on how we get-we got to this place. That agreement 
wouldn't be effective probably for a number of reasons: Statute of fraud, statute 
of limitations. All I'm doing is give the Court where my client's mind frame was 
back then. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll allow it. I let Mr. Visser give some background 
with that caveat. Because certainly as I think Mr. McLaughlin just objected to 
something, Mr. Featherston said the same thing, you're going outside these 
documents, these documents are controlling so ... 
(Tr. Vol. III, p. 459, L. 11-25; p. 460, L. 1-25). 
Thus, the testimony at trial demonstrates that the District Court and the parties 
understood that the claims and events occurring before the MSA and the Stipulated Judgment 
were background information and not relevant to the District Court' s decision. It was error for 
the District Court to base any part of its decision upon testimony which had been admitted for 
background purposes. 
5. The Court's Decision to Issue a Writ of Possession was Arbitrary, 
and Must be Overturned. 
As set forth in Graves, a fixed forfeiture or damage provision cannot be arbitrary. This 
Court has defined an arbitrary as something "done in disregard of the facts and circumstances 
presented or without adequate determining principles." Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 
734, 536 P.2d 729 (1975). The damage provision fixed by the Stipulated Judgment does not 
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take into account any facts or circumstances surrounding actual damages sustained as a result of 
breach, nor are there any adequate determining principles as to whether the forfeiture should be 
allowed. Rather, by the terms of the Stipulated Judgment, the forfeiture is automatically 
enforceable by means of a writ of possession as a result of any breach, regardless of the 
magnitude of the breach. The District Court's decision to enforce the forfeiture was likewise 
arbitrary because it did not consider the relevant facts or circumstances regarding the relation 
between Vicki's forfeited payments and labors, and Doug's actual damages. 
The damage provision in the Stipulated Judgment is arbitrary and intended to function as 
a penalty because it is applicable even where the breach is not material. The provision is clearly 
intended to apply if Vicki fails to comply with any obligation set forth in the Stipulated 
Judgment, no matter how trivial. Thus, Vicki's failure to remove all personal property from Lot 
1, ignoring for now the fact that Doug intentionally acted to prevent Vicki from complying with 
this obligation, triggered the forfeiture provision and permitted Doug to take and retain the 
benefit of the entirety of Vicki's payments and efforts, without compensation of any kind for 
such payments or improvements. Such a provision cannot be enforced, as explained in the 
following case: 
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Courts "refuse to enforce contract clauses that appear designed to 
deter a breach or to punish the breaching party rather than 
compensate the injured party for damage occasioned by the 
breach." Melaleuca, Inc. v. Foeller, 155 Idaho 920, 927, 318 P.3d 
910, 917 (2014) (quoting Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v. 
Meyer, 133 Idaho 110, 117, 982 P.2d 945, 952 (Ct.App.1999)). 
When forfeiture is "simply a penalty invoked as a result of conduct 
of one of the parties, the forfeiture will not be allowed." Foeller, 
155 Idaho at 927,318 P.3d at 917 (quoting Fleming v. Hathaway, 
107 Idaho 157, 161, 686 P.2d 837, 841 (Ct.App.1984)). Here, if 
Giesler breaches the contract, Giesler loses his development costs 
and the property will be listed for sale. This seems designed only 
to persuade Giesler to complete the contract, and therefore would 
be an unenforceable penalty clause. 
Hull v. Giesler, 156 Idaho 765,780,331 P.3d 507,522 (2014). 
Like the provision in Giesler, the damage provision in the Stipulated Judgment is not 
structured to compensate Doug for his actual losses upon Vicki' s breach of the Stipulated 
Judgment. Rather, by threatening to take everything Vicki had bargained for, and indeed, more 
than Doug had bargained for, the provision was intended to compel Vicki to complete the 
contract, and not to compensate Doug for his potential damages. 
For these reasons, the provision not only functions as a penalty, but was clearly designed 
for the purpose. When the District Court entered the Order granting Doug the writ of restitution, 
it was enforcing a contractual penalty. Such an Order cuts against long established and well 
recognized Idaho precedent. It is axiomatic that the fundamental purpose for awarding damages 
for any breach of contract is to fully recompense the nonbreaching party for its losses sustained 
because of the breach, not to punish the breaching party. See Anderson v. Gailey, 100 Idaho 796, 
801, 606 P.2d 90, 95 (1980). Therefore, the order granting Doug a writ of restitution should be 
reversed. 
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6. The Forfeiture Provision in the Stipulated Judgment is 
Unconscionable and Exorbitant. 
The District Court found that the damage provision was not unconscionable, but made no 
finding as to whether the provision was exorbitant. (R. Vol. III. p. 570). "A trial court's finding 
as to whether liquidated damages constitute an unconscionable penalty will not be overturned 
unless the finding is clearly erroneous." Clampitt, 109 Idaho at 149, 706 P.2d at 38. The District 
Court's finding should be overturned because it is clearly erroneous. There was no finding with 
respect to whether the provision was exorbitant, and the Court engaged in no fact-finding or 
analysis in support of its conclusion that the provision was not unconscionable. 
The District Court found that Vicki breached two provisions of the Stipulated Judgment. 
It found that she failed to pay off the remainder of the Lapham debt in a timely manner and 
failed to fully vacate Lot 1 in a timely manner. (R. Vol. III, p. 568, ,r 20). 
The damage provision is unconscionable and exorbitant because it permits Doug to 
obtain a writ directing the Sheriff to not only restore possession of Lot 2 to him, but also to seize 
and sell all of Vicki and Calvin Visser's personal property. Again, this provision is applicable 
regardless of whether Doug had been actually damaged by Vicki' s breach. It is even more 
unconscionable given that Vicki and Calvin lived and stored all of their personal property on Lot 
2 at the time the agreement was entered into and at the time he sought to enforce the penalty. (R. 
Vol. 111, p. 325, L.6-22; p. 326, L. 17-25). 
The provision is unconscionable and exorbitant given the actual damages occasioned to 
Doug. There is no evidence as to how Vicki's failure to timely pay off the remainder of their 
share of the Lapham debt caused damage to Doug. As to Vicki's failure to fully vacate the 
premises by the agreed upon date, Douglas testified as follows: · 
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MR. FEATHERSTON: All right. Were they out of the 
premises, fully vacated, by April 30th? 
DOUGLAS VISSER: Not quite. 
Q: What was left? 
A: There was miscellaneous stuff in the back shop. There' s 
most of a spray-in bed liner unit in the front shop and all the booth 
that was made that way. There was household goods. Well no, no. 
Excuse me. Those were taken out because they were put out on 
the step and out into the yard and they were-after midnight, I 
locked the door and they- they continued cleanin' that up. 
(Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 371, L. 24-25; p. 372, L. 1-10). 
Evidently, the only damage caused to Doug as a result of this breach is the fact that Vicki 
or Calvin left a spray-in bed liner unit and a booth in the back shop. There was no testimony as 
to whether this breach of the Stipulated Judgment damaged Doug, how it damaged Doug, or the 
extent to which it damaged Doug. Further, the testimony clearly shows that Doug intentionally 
prevented Vicki from removing the remainder of her personal property on Lot 1 by locking the 
door after midnight. Consequently, the breach is not material. However, the Court found Vicki 
in breach of the Stipulated Judgment, in part, for this very reason. To enforce the forfeiture 
provision contained within the Stipulated Judgment for this breach is clearly exorbitant and 
unconscionable, and the District Court' s order granting Doug a writ of restitution pursuant to this 
illegal penalty provision should be reversed. 
As to the District Court's finding that Vicki breached the Stipulated Judgment by 
continuing to use a portion of the road located on Lot 1, there was no evidence that this damaged 
Doug in any manner whatsoever. In fact, Vicki testified that she used only a small section of the 
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road, and no evidence was admitted from which the District Court could have found that this
 
damaged Doug. (Plaintiff's Ex. 12; Tr. Vol. III, p. 204, L. 9-23). 
The only other breach of contract found by the Court was Vicki's failure to completely 
pay off her half of the Lapham Mortgage. However, four different witnesses at the evidentiary
 
hearing - Vicki Visser, Joe Lapham, Margaret Williams, and Rex Finney-all confirmed that Joe
 
Lapham was prepared to allow Vicki to refinance the remainder of her share of this debt so long
 
as Lot 2 could be used as collateral for that debt. (Plaintiff's Ex. 4; Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 104-105; p
. 
178-179; p. 237, L. 11-17; p.307-308). In fact, the Stipulated Judgment specifically 
contemplated exactly this condition, and required the parties to allow refinancing: 
The parties shall (upon subdivision of the property as described 
above) to thereupon divide the debt between Plaintiff and 
Defendants using the respective Parcels 1 and 2 of the platted 
property as collateral for each party's respective share of the 
Lapham obligation and thereby releasing and extinguishing any 
joint liability of Plaintiff Douglas Visser and Defendant, Vicki 
Visser on the Lapham debt. 
(Defendants' Ex. 17) (emphasis added). 
Douglas Visser, however, refused to allow Vicki to have title to the property, or utilize it 
as collateral, until she performed additional tasks for which she was not obligated, such as to
 
construct a new road, and to perform additional environmental tests upon Lot 1. As set forth in
 
the following section of this brief, because Doug prevented Vicki from paying off the remainder
 
of Vicki's share of the Lapham Mortgage, it was error for the Court to hold that Vicki had
 
forfeited her entire investment because of the failure to pay the entirety of this debt. Moreover
, 
the Court made no finding as to how Vicki' s breach of the Stipulated Judgment actually
 
damaged Doug, or whether such damages were reasonably related to the amount forfeited by
 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 33 
Vicki. Consequently, the Court' s decision constitutes an abuse of discretion and should be 
reversed. 
b. The Court Erred in finding that Doug did not Prevent Vicki with Complying 
with the Terms of the Judgment. 
Vicki also asserts that the District Court erred by finding that Doug did not interfere with 
Vicki's attempts to pay off her share of the Lapham Mortgage, as this finding is not supported by 
the evidence, and was, in fact, directly contradicted by the admission of Doug himself, as well as 
the testimony of three other witnesses. At the evidentiary hearing, Vicki argued that Doug was in 
contempt of Court for encumbering Lots 1 and 2, as that prevented Vicki from using Lot 2 as 
collateral to refinance her share of the Lapham Mortgage. 
The duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied into every contract in this state, and 
includes with it a duty to cooperate with the other party in furtherance of the objectives of the 
contract. Dave's Inc. v. Linford, 153 Idaho 744, 752, 291 P.3d 427, 435 (2012). A party' s 
breach of the contractual duty to cooperate triggers the doctrine of prevention. "The doctrine of 
prevention is an equitable doctrine designed to excuse non-performance by the nonbreaching 
party." Morton Buildings, Inc. v. Dept. of Human Resources, 695 P.2d at 450 citing 5 
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 676 (3rd. ed. 1961). It is intended to provide a mechanism by 
which the party desiring to perform may establish that the other party has breached the contract 
before its completion, and may seek recompense for that breach. The fundamental purpose for 
awarding damages for any breach of contract remains the same: to fully recompense the 
nonbreaching party for its losses sustained because of the breach, not to punish the breaching 
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party. See Anderson v. Gailey, 100 Idaho 796,801,606 P.2d 90, 95 (1980); Hirst v. St. Paul Fire 
& Marine Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 792,683 P.2d 440 (Ct.App.1984). 
The Supreme Court held in McOmber v. Nuckols, 82 Idaho 280, 353 P.2d 398 (1960), 
that a plaintiff who imposed conditions which made performance by the defendant impracticable 
could not recover damages. To excuse nonperformance, the conduct of the party preventing 
performance must be wrongful, in excess of their legal rights, unjustified, or outside the 
reasonable contemplation of the parties when the contract was executed. 17A C.J.S. Contracts§ 
468; Sullivan v. Bullock, 124 Idaho 738,742,864 P.2d 184, 188 (Ct. App. 1993). 
In its First Memorandum Decision and Order, the District Court found that Vicki had 
"not fully satisfied all of [her] obligations under the terms of the Judgment," and therefore "Doug 
was not required to convey title to Lot 2." (R. Vol. III, p. 474). Vicki moved for 
reconsideration, pointing out that the District Court ignored evidence showing that Doug refused 
to allow Vicki to use Lot 2 as collateral for a refinance until she had completed newly imposed 
obligations that were not contained in the Stipulated Judgment. (R. Vol. III, p. 501-503). In its 
Second Memorandum Decision and Order, the District Court stated that it would not find that 
Doug prevented Vicki from paying her share of the Lapham debt. (R. Vol. III, p. 566). The 
District Court found that Doug was not required to allow Vicki to use Lot 2 as collateral until 
Vicki had completely fulfilled her obligations under the Judgment. (R. Vol. III, p. 566). For 
those reasons, the District Court denied Vicki's motion for reconsideration. 
The evidence submitted at the evidentiary hearing cannot support the Court's finding that 
Doug did not interfere with Vicki's ability to pay off her share of the Lapham Mortgage. Vicki 
demonstrated that she had paid all but $31,850.45 of her share of the Mortgage. Vicki, as well as 
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Joe Lapham, Margaret Williams, and Rex Finney, testified that Vicki and Joe Lapham had 
reached an agreement whereby Mr. Lapham would refinance the remaining portion of Vicki's 
share of the debt, using Lot 2 as collateral, which would have satisfied Vicki' s obligation. 
(Plaintiff's Ex. 4; Tr. Vol. III, p. 104-105; p. 178-179; p. 237, L. 11-17; p. 307-308). Utilizing 
Lot 2 as collateral in this way was specifically provided in the Stipulated Judgment. 
The parties shall (upon subdivision of the property as described 
above) to thereupon divide the debt between Plaintiff and 
Defendants using the respective Parcels 1 and 2 of the platted 
property as collateral for each party's respective share of the 
iapham obligation and thereby releasing and extinguishing any 
joint liability of Plaintiff Douglas Visser and Defendant, Vicki 
Visser on the Lapham debt. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 92, ,r 5). (emphasis added). 
Doug, however, refused to allow Vicki to convey Lot 2 as collateral for the loan, or to 
convey Lot 2 to Vicki, unless and until Vicki performed tasks for which she was not obligated to 
perform by the Stipulated Judgment. These additional tasks were clearly set forth in the letter of 
August 27, 2014, from counsel for Doug to counsel for Vicki, in which Doug acknowledges that 
"the Plat is complete and that Lot 2 can be deeded to your client, however she needs to perform 
on the requirements of our agreement before the deed will be delivered." (Plaintiff'sEx. 4). 
Doug then demands that Vicki build a new road, fully remediate Lot 1 with regard to any 
environmental concerns, provide plans for a privacy fence, perform additional work on the 
parking lot, obtain a new water connection for Lot 2, and pay $2,500 to Douglas Visser. Id. 
Furthermore, Margaret Williams, Rex Finney, Joe Lapham, anc! Vicki Visser testify about the 
additional requirements Doug was attempting to impose on Vicki before transferring title to Lot 
2. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 128-129; p .179, L.7-23; p. 254, L.21-25, p.255, L.1-23; p. 308, L.17-25; p. 
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309, L. 1-20; p.392, L.2-22; p. 417-418). None of these "requirements" Doug attempted to 
impose are found in the Stipulated Judgment. 
Doug also testified at trial that when Vicki would ask Doug for title to Lot 2, he 
responded by demanding that she first build a road. 
Q. Vicki testified this morning that she recalls talking to you at 
a time where she says she asked you for a deed to Lot 2. Do you 
recall that conversation? 
A. I don't. She would always ask for that, as - as that passing 
a couple words would be said. But as far as a meeting to have a 
meeting to discuss that, no. We didn't. 
Q. And did you -- how did you respond to her when she 
would ask for a deed to the property? 
A. I would ask her when the road is gonna be built. 
(Tr. Vol. III, p. 392, L. 12-22). 
Thus, Doug admitted that he refused to transfer title to Lot 2 until Vicki built a road on 
Doug's property. Yet, the Stipulated Judgment did not impose upon Vicki an obligation to build 
Doug a new road, and Doug had no right to condition his compliance with the Judgment with 
additional tasks for Vicki to accomplish. By Doug's own admission, therefore, he interfered 
with Vicki's ability to pay off the remainder of her share of the Lapham Mortgage. 
As described in the previous sections, Doug's refusal to allow Vicki to use Lot 2 as 
collateral to refinance her remaining share of the Lapham debt, and locking the doors of the 
garage at midnight so she could not finish vacating Lot 1, demonstrate that Doug breached his 
duty to cooperate. Furthermore, in light of the language of the Stipulated Judgment, Doug's 
behavior was unjustified and outside the reasonable contemplation of the parties when the 
contract was executed. 
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Doug's conduct was wrongful and in excess of his legal rights because he did not give 
Vicki notice that he was going to encumber Lot 2. He testified that "after Vicki ruined the sale," 
he was done "helping her" and thereafter stopped communicating with her. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 403-
405; p. 443, L.1-8). The "sale" referred to by Doug was an offer by a third party to purchase 
Lots 1 and 2. (Id.; Tr. Vol. III, p.284, L.17-25, p. 285, L. 1-10). Immediately after 
Vicki "ruined the sale," Doug admits that he made efforts to block vehicular access to Lot 2." 
(Tr. Vol. III, p. 393-396). Whether Doug's purpose was to exclude Vicki from accessing her 
home or to prevent her running her business, this behavior is indicative of a dereliction of the 
duty to cooperate. 
With regard to the potential sale of Lots 1 and 2, Vicki was under no obligation to sell 
and she undertook no action to ruin that sale other than to refuse to accept the offer. In fact, the 
primary object that Vicki had bargained for in the Stipulated Judgment was title to Lot 2 so she 
and her son could continue to operate their business. In retaliation for Vicki' s decision to decline 
to sell Lot 2, Doug made good on his promise that he was done helping Vicki and "helped 
himself' by refinancing the Lapham mortgage without any notice whatsoever to Vicki. 
For these reasons, Vicki's nonperformance should be excused because Doug prevented 
her from complying with the terms of the Judgment and Doug's actions were wrongful, 
unjustified, in excess of his legal rights, and outside of the reasonable contemplation of the 
parties when the contract was executed. 
Doug' s actions put Vicki in a Catch-22 situation. She had obtained a commitment from 
Joe Lapham to refinance the remainder of her obligation. However, Joe Lapham needed Lot 2 as 
security for this commitment. At the same time, Doug refused to give Lot 2 to Vicki until she 
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paid off the Lapham debt. However, Vicki and Mr. Lapham were not parties to a contract that 
contemplated transferring title to property for refinancing purposes. Vicki and Doug, on the 
other hand, were parties to such a contract; a contract that specifically contemplated these events. 
Doug's refusal to cooperate with Vicki constitutes a breach of the judgment and excuses Vicki' s 
nonperformance. 
The facts here show that Vicki paid approximately $236,000.00 towards satisfaction of 
the Stipulated Judgment, of which approximately $149,000 was paid to reduce the Lapham 
Mortgage. (Defendants' Ex. H). Doug presented no evidence that he made more than $5,000 in 
payments towards the Lapham debt, though he argued several of Vicki's payments should be 
credited to his half of the debt. (R Vol. II, p. 342-343, ,r 2). Although the District Court 
declined to make a finding on whether those sums should have been credited to Doug or the 
balance of each parties' obligation on the Lapham Mortgage at the time it was refinanced, the 
argument advanced by Doug shows that his contribution towards the Lapham debt pales in 
comparison to the amount expended by Vicki. 
For the aforementioned reasons, Doug prevented Vicki's performance of her obligations 
under the Stipulated Judgment. The District Court was not persuaded by these facts, but made 
no findings with regard to them, even after Vicki specifically asked the court to make them. (R. 
Vol. III, p. 501, ,r B). The District Court, therefore, committed reversible error, and Vicki 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse and remand. 
c. Vicki Is Entitled to Attorneys Fees on Appeal. 
The Stipulated Judgment contains an attorneys' fee clause. (R. Vol. III, p. 95, ,r H). If 
Vicki prevails upon appeal, she is therefore entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
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V. CONCLUSION. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse the 
decision of the District Court. 
DATED this 5th day of May, 2016. 
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